Modernity and Morality in the Context of Social Change: Emotivism[*]

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Abstract: This study aims to present a rough outline related to the basic transformations that morality has undergone in the social sphere and its institutional infrastructure due to placing morality in an individual field, and hence a psychological or transcendental field as well as an absolute and philosophical field. In this context, morality is perceived as a human phenomenon that becomes possible through the production of good, evil, right, and wrong in a way that transcends the conceptual dualities of good and evil and right and wrong. Similarly, dealing with morality on the axis of change from the understandings of its function and usefulness in individual and social aspects is acceptable by seating the moral individual and moralistic action within a historical and social context. Usefulness and functionality are phenomena defined and bounded within general social structure. From this perspective of every moral theory, benefit and function must be defined from both social and individual points. This dimension allows human beings to describe a moral world based on their existence in the social sphere instead of acting from a transcendental acceptance through its philosophical vicinity. In this respect, morality is addressed entirely through the mentality, language, and practices identifying dualisms like good/evil, right/wrong, and beneficial/harmful, which must be addressed within the likely historical and social conditions as a social phenomenon as well as identifying the vague areas between them. At the starting point of modern ethical theories lay the institutionally and epistemologically rupturing of the relationship between what is and what should be. The process that reveals or triggers this tension is not just being in a form parallel to the destruction of the traditional corporate infrastructure that has constructed, controlled, and proclaimed what is and what should be; at the same time, morality is reduced to a position that the market and modern political arena instrumentalize by embarking on control of the scientific-economic-political structure. Classical or traditional morality is justified either through language morality or a language grounded in the past, or through transcendence surpassing memory. This situation raises morality to a top position that constructs rationality as befits what comes from being an individual response. The placement of feelings on the basis of authentic morality lies at the root of the loss of coherence in culture by elevating emotions to a position that doesn't recognize any higher authority. Emotivism in this context has moved a large chapter of life out of the entire traditional moral framework by developing a legitimate and instrumental ethical language and way of being that allow the modern political and economic order to construct and supervise individuals' cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic awareness. The positioning of morality in accordance with the needs of the market and politics, as well as the loss of morality's critical potential, has become possible through emotionalism under the guise of authenticity and autonomy.

Keywords: morality • modernity • emotivism • politics • market

This study aims to present a rough outline related to the basic transformations that morality has undergone in the social sphere and its institutional infrastructure due to placing morality in an individual field, and hence a psychological or transcendental field as well as an absolute and philosophical field. In this context, morality is perceived as a human phenomenon that becomes possible through the production of good, evil, right, and wrong in a way that transcends the conceptual dualities of good and evil and right and wrong. Similarly, dealing with morality on the axis of change from the understandings of its function and usefulness in individual and social aspects is acceptable by seating the moral individual and moralistic action within a historical and social context. Usefulness and functionality are phenomena defined and bounded within general social structure. From this perspective of every moral theory, benefit and function must be defined from both social and individual points. This dimension allows human beings to describe a moral world based on their existence in the social sphere instead of acting from a transcendental acceptance through its philosophical vicinity. In this respect, morality is addressed entirely through the mentality, language, and practices identifying dualisms like good/evil, right/wrong, and beneficial/harmful, which must be addressed within the likely historical and social conditions as a social phenomenon as well as identifying the vague areas between them.

Through its traditional form, morality is based on the social experience needed for *eyes turned to the past and to transcendence* to construct *by seeing and feeling*. Morality in modern times has transformed into an entire set of rules that one must find within oneself and, from this perspective, also must impose upon one's self by bracketing both the past and what is transcendent: *Morality has been constructed as an extension of rationality instead of sight and perception*. Morality, whether being included within traditional or modern dimensions, is only possible by having an existence possessing the potential to be a moral agent. This agency needs to be discussed as either a potential situation or one that has been realized. The basis of this agency in pre-modern societies becomes possible only by behaving within certain predetermined dimensions. In modern times, rather than an individual's practices and behaviors, morality largely loses external frames of reference by accepting its potential of agency as the basis. This has taken place at the end of a larger social transformation, which Charles Taylor (2014, p. 631) has indicated as the internalization of frames of reference that means exclusion of transcendental frame of reference by inventing secular *immanent frame*.

Morality also foresees freedom as a must, or liberty in a different dimension. Freedom refers to religion and the traditional world, where humans are considered to be a teleogical existence to the degree it emphasizes an essence. Liberty expresses perceiving what teleology isolates on a moral note and humans on the axis of an understanding of liberty that can be conceptualized as a negative freedom or unbound

state. Kant, a leading name in modern moral philosophy, not only brought an accounting of the philosophy of the Enlightenment to a high point using tradition but also offered a significant contribution to legitimizing the social sphere reproduced by the level of capitalist economic order as a blank slate. Meanwhile, the conceptualization of positive and negative freedom, together with how this conceptual duality holds an important place in liberal political theory, reflects the difference between traditional and modern societies. While situations where the individual has no will beyond their own willpower and where absolute authority over one's life is accepted fall under the scope of negative freedom, positive freedom can be defined by the existence of external authorities by which the individual must abide. A list of positive freedoms defined within the framework of national state and capitalist market relations exists in modern societies; however, all traditional language- and practice-based freedoms are addressed under the scope of negative freedom.

Modern morality constructs the subject type with reference to self-morality by separating traditional morality into three basic dimensions. These can be conceptualized as the construction of politics and capitalism in the centrality of the body, the priority of what can be measured, and the dominance of rationality and the sensory-emotional domain. These three dimensions emerge at the end of a process that the cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic transformations have guided at the center of the economic and political developments that make modern social order possible. Again in a similar direction, while modern morality has been constructed at the center of idealized modern individualist thought, many attitudes and practices accepted morally at the traditional level are proclaimed to be unrelated to morality due to the expansion of non-moral areas. The most important transformation in the modern period related to the field of morality is the certainty of morality, or the loss of its metaphysical origin. While this corresponds to a situation that can be evaluated as a crisis of meaning, modern experience both encounters this state of inconsistency and rootlessness as a positive situation and embarks upon rebuilding morality by developing a group of different institutional and intellectual areas for garnering the language and practice that will also make social life possible. The two determinant elements that reveal the most important differences of modern and traditional forms of moral existence from language are the role that has been hewn into politics and economics and their modes of operation. The changes that make these roles possible in the social sphere are the rationalization processes that allow the ability to measure the loss of integrity and life that emerge along the axis of institutional differentiation.

At the starting point of modern ethical theories lay the institutionally and epistemologically rupturing of the relationship between what is and what should be. The process that reveals or triggers this tension is not just being in a form parallel to the destruction of the traditional corporate infrastructure that has constructed,

controlled, and proclaimed what is and what should be; at the same time, morality is reduced to a position that the market and modern political arena instrumentalize by embarking on control of the scientific-economic-political structure. Classical or traditional morality is justified either through language morality or a language grounded in the past, or through transcendence surpassing memory. This situation raises morality to a top position that constructs rationality as befits what comes from being an individual response. While on one hand modern morality creates more space than ever for the individual and individual autonomy, on the other it constructs one of the contradictions of modernity: The idea of the autonomous individual and the idea of the dependent individual emerge at the same time. This tension is both produced and supervised through the mediation of modern institutions. Bell specified that this tension comes to mean "the loss of coherence in culture" (Bell, 2011, p. 1173). The placement of feelings on the basis of authentic morality lies at the root of the loss of coherence in culture by elevating emotions to a position that doesn't recognize any higher authority. Emotionality in this context has moved a large chapter of life out of the entire traditional moral framework by developing a legitimate and instrumental ethical language and way of being that allow the modern political and economic order to construct and supervise individuals' cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic awareness. The positioning of morality in accordance with the needs of the market and politics, as well as the loss of morality's critical potential, has become possible through emotionalism under the guise of authenticity and autonomy.

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